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David J. Scheffer *
United Nations Peace Operations and
Prospects for a Standby Force
One of the most challenging and vexing issues facing U.N. peace opera-
tions today is the proposal for the creation of a permanent, standby, rapid
reaction, or on-call military force acting under U.N. authority. No such
U.N. force has ever existed, and the prospects for one in the near future
remain dim. Nonetheless, renewed examination of such a proposal after
the Cold War and in the wake of the dramatic growth in U.N. peace opera-
dons during the post-Cold War era is both understandable and useful.
This article addresses five areas of inquiry: 1) the original intent
behind Article 43 of the U.N. Charter and its fate immediately after World
War II; 2) recent efforts to improve standby or rapid reaction capabilities;
3) the Secretary-General's 1995 proposal for a rapid reaction force; 4) gov-
ernment proposals; and 5) pragmatic next steps.
I. Beginnings: Article 43 and Original Intent
Article 43 of the U.N. Charter is the legal mechanism by which the United
Nations could have created an on-call military force after World War II.
The diplomatic negotiations on what became Article 43 unfolded at Dum-
barton Oaks in 1944.1 The major Allied powers-the United States, the
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China-undertook a detailed
examination of whether or not there should be a permanent military force
for the United Nations. They concluded that there should not be a per-
manent force,2 but opted instead for an on-call force as described in Arti-
cle 43.
Under Article 43, governments of U.N. Member States are to negoti-
ate "special agreements" with the Security Council. These Article 43 spe-
cial agreements would comprise the collective capabilities of Member
States that would be on call to the Security Council and ready for deploy-
ment if and when the Security Council reaches an Article 42 decision to
* The author is Senior Adviser & Counsel to the U.S. Permanent Representative
to the United Nations (1993- ). He is a member of the New York and District of
Columbia Bars, a former Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, and a former associate attorney at the international law firm of
Coudert Brothers. The views expressed herein are those of the author and not
necessarily those of the U.S. Government.
1. See ROBERT C. HILDERBRAND, DUMBARTON OAKS 140-42 (1990); RUTH B. RUSSELL,
A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 467-72 (1958).
2. See DavidJ. Scheffer, Commentary on Collective Security, in LAw AND FORCE IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 106-07 (L. Damrosch & D. Scheffer eds., 1991).
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use military forces for enforcement purposes.3
The special agreement negotiated by a government would establish
what would be made available to the United Nations and under what con-
ditions. For example, if a government decided that it would provide
troops or equipment or rights of passage to the United Nations, details
would be settled in negotiations between that government and the United
Nations.
It was entirely possible that a uniform special agreement would evolve
to provide consistency in how governments would negotiate the basic pro-
cess for providing troops and equipment to the United Nations. One
could envisage several governments signing a collective special agreement
with the United Nations. In reality, the terms of a particular bargain
always turned on the negotiating process between a particular government
and the United Nations.4
However, the special agreements, and thus Article 43, were stillborn.
This occurred despite the fact that serious efforts were made to implement
Article 43 in the late 1940s. The Big Five (United States, United Kingdom,
Soviet Union, France, and China) negotiated a model special agreement
which would resolve the detailed arrangements for the on-call capabilities
among their large military forces. The Big Five produced a text with cer-
tain key provisions still bracketed and requiring further negotiation. 5
The Cold War and the realities of superpower politics intervened.
The grand bargain, which appeared promising in the draft model special
agreement, fell apart.6 The United States and the Soviet Union in particu-
lar could not agree on the number and character of forces that Member
States would provide to the United Nations. With the start of the Korean
War and the resulting rift between Washington and both Moscow and Bei-
jing over the role of the United Nations in that war, the concept of a
3. For general discussion on the original intent behind Article 43, see GOODRICH
ET AL, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 316-26 (3d ed.,
1969); RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 678-80; HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS
767-68 (4th prtg. 1964); Oscar Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and
Regional Organizations, in LAw AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 68-69 (L.
Damrosch & D. Scheffer eds., 1991); D.W. BowETr, UNITED NATIONS FORCES 12-18, 313-
78 (1964).
4. See Russell, supra note 1, at 680.
5. The U.N. Military Staff Committee issued a report dated April 30, 1947, propos-
ing general principles for implementing Article 43 that could be used in a model spe-
cial agreement. For the text of the articles regarding the General Principles Governing
the Organization of the Armed Forces Made Available to the Security Council by Mem-
ber Nations of the United Nations, as amended by the Security Council, along with a
series of introductory notes, see UNITED NATIONS, 2 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED
NATIONS ORGANS 277-80 (Supp. No. 2, 1955). For the documentary record of U.S. par-
ticipation in the work of the Military Staff Committee on Article 43, see I FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1946 718-21, 727-28, 759-60, 766, 769-73, 775-76, 779-
80, 783-85, 790, 796-801, 802, 873-76, 894-98, 905-06, 914-15, 917-18, 930-32, 949-51
(1972); 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1947 356-58, 390-91, 402-04, 433-
36, 447-50, 465-70, 477-78, 482-84, 492-97, 632-45, 656-59, 665-70 (1973).
6. See Bowett, supra note 3, at 398-405; W.R. FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE
53-55 (1957); LARRY L. FABIAN, SOLDIERS WITHOUT ENEMIES 60-61 (1971).
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standby U.N. force was never again seriously discussed by the Permanent
Members of the Security Council.
Despite the collapse of the Article 43 negotiations among the major
powers, the U.S. Congress and executive branch reached a bargain regard-
ing Article 43, which remains part of the legislative history and federal law
of the United States. This bargain was forged during the Senate debate to
ratify the U.N. Charter and in the Congressional debate that preceded the
passage of the U.N. Participation Act of 1945. Those debates contain a
rich and fascinating story of Congress' original intent with respect to the
Article 43 concept of an on-call force.7
In summary, the bargain was based on the presumption in 1945 that
the U.S. Government would negotiate a special agreement with the United
Nations and do so fairly soon. Assuming that the United States would
commit a certain number of soldiers, officials in Washington engaged in
considerable debate as to the appropriate character of an on-call force as
negotiated under the special agreement. The on-call force would act in
the capacity of an international police force by taking certain police
actions on behalf of the U.N. Security Council in conflict areas. But the
on-call force was not intended to be a war-fighting machine per se, and the
U.S. Government would not be obligated to provide a war-fighting force to
the United Nations. If the U.N. Security Council wanted to wage wars in
order to enforce its resolutions under Chapter VII to restore international
peace and security, Congress intended to play a larger role. One might
summarize the Congressional view as follows:
Mr. President, we approve your special agreement with the United Nations.
We have provided you with [as an example] 20,000 soldiers that you can use
with the United Nations in 'police actions' without having to obtain further
Congressional approval. But anything beyond that number and you will
need to return to Congress for approval. We still have the power to declare
war under our Constitution. Therefore we are striking a bargain. You get a
certain number of soldiers for UN police actions, but beyond that you come
back to us for approval.8
This bargain is reflected in Section 6 of the U.N. Participation Act of
1945, 9 but there has never been any reason to implement it. Neither the
United States nor any other government returned to the Article 43 process
after the collapse of the negotiations for a model special agreement.
7. See generally DavidJ. Scheffer, War Powers and the U.N. Charter. Constraints on the
President s Power to Commit U.S. Armed Forces to Combat under the Authority of the U.N. Security
Council, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL RoLEs OF CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN DECLARING
AND WAGING WAR, HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess., 5-27 (1991); Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and
the United Nations, 81 GEo. L.J. 597 (1998).
8. This summary is drawn from the author's paper, supra note 7, and the official
record of Congressional deliberations in 1945. See generally Stromseth, supra note 7.
9. U.N. Participation Act of 1945, § 6, 59 Stat. 619 (1945) (current version at 22
U.S.C. § 28).
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II. Recent Initiatives to Improve Rapid Response Capabilities
Since U.N. peace operations grew dramatically both in number and com-
plexity in the early 1990s, there have been several instances where the lack
of a rapid deployment capability on the part of the United Nations has
created great difficulties in the field. For example, the peacekeeping
operation in Cambodia suffered from slow deployment of infantry battal-
ions, civil administration units, and civilian police units, and some ele-
ments were never fully deployed. Delayed deployment of UNPROFOR
infantry components posed a significant risk to the cease-fire in Croatia in
early 1992. In Somalia, the delayed deployment of UNOSOM I (author-
ized in August of 1992 for full deployment by October of that year I )
handicapped U.N. efforts to prevent deterioration of the security situa-
tion. By December 1992, with starvation taking thousands of Somali lives,
the United States was compelled to obtain Security Council authorization
for UNITAF, the large multinational force led by the United States."
Most dramatically, the lack of an appropriately staffed and equipped force
contributed to the United Nations' inability to deter or halt the genocide
which occurred throughout Rwanda in the spring of 1994.
Some deployments in the past were comparatively rapid. In 1973, the
emergency force in the Middle East deployed 600 men within forty-eight
hours. In 1960, several U.N. peacekeeping companies were deployed to
the Congo in two days. In 1988, the U.N. observer force of 307 personnel
for the border between Iran and Iraq was deployed within eleven days.
These deployments occurred without a permanent force but with a polit-
ical will and an ability under those circumstances to deploy quickly. 12
The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 pressured the Secretary-General and
intensified interest among Member States to develop means for rapid and
effective responses to emergencies requiring peace operation forces.
From its inception, the Clinton Administration has been deeply
involved in the development and implementation of a new policy on mul-
tilateral peace operations. This process was launched pursuant to Presi-
dential Review Directive 13 (PRD-13), which directed relevant federal
agencies to examine a wide range of reform issues for peacekeeping. In
May 1994, the PRD-13 study was finalized with policy directives in Presi-
dential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25).13
During the PRD-13 process, Executive Branch officials deliberated on
the feasibility of implementing Article 43. They decided not to pursue an
Article 43 special agreement with the United Nations, especially since the
U.N. Security Council had not yet initiated such agreements with Member
10. S.C. Res. 775, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3110th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/775
(1992).
11. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794
(1992).
12. For descriptions of these operations, see UNITED NATIONS, THE BLUE HELMETS:
A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING (2d ed. 1990).
13. See United States: Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 33
I.L.M. 795 (1994).
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States as envisaged by the Charter.14 U.S. officials also determined that
the PDD-25 recommendations, for a variety of reasons, were workable,
pragmatic, and preferable to an Article 43 special agreement under the
circumstances.
The Administration's bottom-up review of peacekeeping revealed that
the infrastructure for peacekeeping remained inadequate. Officials con-
cluded that the United States should approach a greater U.N. role in
peacekeeping in an incremental fashion. The guiding principle was "to
get peacekeeping right first" before further considering Article 43.
Understandably, there is a natural tendency on the part of U.S. military
authorities (and the militaries of other nations) to resist Article 43 because
of its potential for placing national troops under U.N. command. Further,
during the 1992 presidential campaign, then- Governor Bill Clinton did
not pledge to sign Article 43 agreements. He spoke instead about the
need for a rapid-deployment force.15
The factors for U.S. approval of and participation in U.N. peace oper-
ations set forth in PDD-25 established standards that would have to be
mirrored in any special agreement negotiated under Article 43. The
reform measures in PDD-25 were designed partly to enhance the standby
capabilities of the United Nations, a prerequisite to Article 43 special
agreements.
PDD-25 contains a series of recommendations for making U.N. peace
operations more efficient and effective. Implementation of these recom-
mendations has been an on-going Administration priority. In 1994, the
U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) evolved into a
more fully integrated organization with improved management, planning,
and logistics capabilities. The Administration has worked with the United
Nations and other Member States to improve U.N. ability to respond rap-
idly to crises.
On September 26, 1994, the United States delivered its first standby
capabilities report to the United Nations.' 6 It lists U.S. military capabili-
ties, as opposed to specific military units, that might be available under
appropriate circumstances for use in peace operations. The U.S. submis-
sion helped fulfill the commitment of PDD-25 to make U.S. capabilities
available for the full spectrum of peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations.
The Administration supported the initiative to create a "United
Nations Standby Arrangements System" which now includes a database
14. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 3.
15. See Governor Bill Clinton, A New Covenant for American Security, Address at
Georgetown University (Dec. 12, 1991); Governor Bill Clinton, Address Before the For-
eign Policy Association, in New York, N.Y. (Apr. 1, 1992); Governor Bill Clinton,
Address Before Los Angeles World Affairs Council, in Los Angeles, CA (Aug. 13, 1992).
16. Listing of Militay Capabilities of the Government of the United States of America for the
United Nations Standby Forces Data Base Initiative, in Letter from Madeleine K. Albright,
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, to Kofi A. Annan, U.N. Under
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, app. at 1-3 (Sept. 26, 1994) (on file
with the Conell International Law Journal) [hereinafter Albright Letter].
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containing the standby capabilities of more than forty Member States.
Such an information base should improve U.N. capability to plan for new
and ongoing operations and should facilitate a more rapid response when
peacekeeping operations are authorized by the Security Council.1 7 To
summarize the plan:
[T] he Standby Arrangements System is an efficiency enhancement process
based on conditional offers by Member States of specified resources which
could be made available within agreed response times for UN peacekeeping
operations. These resources can be military individuals or units, civilian
police, specialized personnel (civilian and military), services as well as mate-
rial and equipment. The agreed-upon resources remain on "standby"
which implies that they remain in their home country, where requisite train-
ing is conducted to prepare them to fulfill specific tasks or functions in
accordance with UN training guidelines. Standby resources are to be used
exclusively for peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council
and should not be confused with peace-enforcement units, which are
described in the Agenda for Peace as forces meant to respond to "outright
aggression, imminent or actual". Institutionalisation of the process calls for
the Member State[s] to provide the Secretariat with detailed information
and data related to probable contributions from their States.i s
Upon reviewing U.N. missions in which the United States partici-
pated, U.S. officials saw a clear pattern of requirements emerge. While
the United Nations has a large potential base from which to draw ground
troops, it has very few sources for some of the most technical and resource-
intensive capabilities. It is in these areas that the United Nations most
often approaches the United States, and it is in these areas that the United
States believes it can make an important contribution.
In the event that the Security Council approves a U.N. peacekeeping
operation and the U.S. Government decides to assist or participate in such
an operation, the United Nations may approach the United States to pro-
vide the following range of capabilities:
- Strategic airlift and sealift
- Logistics including headquarters logistics support
- Medical support
- Strategic communications support
- Civil affairs and psychological operations support
17. The mandate for the Standby Arrangements System specifies that it should
evolve: "To maintain a system of standby resources, able to be deployed as a whole or in
parts, anywhere in the world, at the Secretary-General's request, within agreed response
times, for peace-keeping duties, as mandated by the Security Council." United Nations
Standby Arrangements Systems, Briefing by U.N. Officials to Member State Representa-
tives, in New York N.Y. (June 16, 1995) (on file with the Cornell International Law
Journal).
18. Id. at 2. As ofJune 16, 1995, 44 Member States had confirmed their willingness
to participate in the Standby Arrangements System. Thirty of the 44 Member States
had provided detailed lists of specific capabilities; 10 of these States had provided the
requisite volumetric information and technical data that would enable the system to
work. Only Jordan and Denmark had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
the United Nations, formalizing the legal details of their contribution to the Standby
Arrangements System.
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- Coalition support
- Engineer support
- Information (intelligence) support
- Contracting and contract management services
- Personnel services for U.N. Headquarters staff functions1 9
The United States reported that this listing constitutes a basis for planning
only and is not intended to indicate any prior commitment or preclude
contribution of the full range of other U.S. capabilities.20 The United
States places great significance on the integration of the U.N. Standby
Capabilities Initiative Units into the Mission Planning Service of the
DPKO. In furtherance of the Standby Capabilities effort, the United
States will favorably consider requests for resources that will aid in the
planning and operation support of U.N. peacekeeping operations.
2 1
I. U.N. Secretary-General's Proposal of January 1995
In earlyJanuary 1995, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali pro-
posed in his position paper, entitled Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, that
serious thought should be given to creating a U.N. rapid reaction force.
22
The Secretary-General acknowledged the recent progress on standby
arrangements but cautioned that these developments did not yet solve the
problem. Although there is much interest in enabling the United Nations
to respond speedily to future Rwanda-like emergencies, in 1994 none of
the nineteen governments that had made standby commitments agreed to
contribute to an expanded UNAMIR.
The Secretary-General proposed establishment of a "rapid reaction
force" to serve as a "strategic reserve" capable of meeting emergency
peacekeeping needs. It would be composed of battalion-sized units sta-
tioned in home countries and maintained at a high state of readiness.
The units of the force would receive the same levels of training, use the
same operating procedures, use integrated communications equipment,
and exercise together regularly. The Secretary-General reported:
I have come to the conclusion that the United Nations does need to give
serious thought to the idea of a rapid reaction force. Such a force would be
the Security Council's strategic reserve for deployment when there was an
emergency need for peacekeeping troops. It might comprise battalion-
sized units from a number of countries.... The value of this arrangement
would of course depend on how far the Security Council could be sure that
the force would actually be available in an emergency. This will be a com-
plicated and expensive arrangement, but I believe that the time has come to
undertake it.23
19. Albright Letter, supra note 16, at 2.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General U.N.
GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/50/60, S/1995/1 (1995).
23. Id. at 11, 44.
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Opinion among Member States, however, remains divided on whether
and how to undertake the creation of such a force. Some governments
accept the Secretary-General's view that only a trained, equipped, and
dedicated force can guarantee that troops will be available on-call-a con-
dition that current standby arrangements, no matter how efficient and
comprehensive, cannot meet.
Other governments are attracted to a standing force idea as a means
of promoting their own causes. For instance, nations may want to reinvig-
orate an operational and authoritative Military Staff Committee so that
they can exercise more control over U.N. operations. Others may want
the General Assembly to play a key role in creating such a rapid reaction
force and directing its operations.
However, the broader reaction among Member States is more cau-
tious. Most Member States want to observe whether the United Nations
has the capability to respond rapidly before they proceed to the next step
and authorize a rapid reaction force.
The United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Indonesia
expressed some doubts during Security Council formal discussions on the
Secretary-General's report. All Council members and twenty-three non-
members participated in a substantive exchange on January 18 and 19,
1995.24
U.S. concerns included whether the command structure for such a
rapid reaction force would meet U.S. requirements as stipulated in PDD-
25. The United States also emphasized the need to accelerate the
response time and capabilities of individual countries. However, the cost
of such a force could be prohibitive. Further, one could envisage a stand-
ing U.N. force being used only once, remaining in the mission area for an
extended period of time, and thus defeating its intended purpose for
rapid deployment in any subsequent operations.
U.S. Permanent Representative Madeleine K. Albright argued that
setting aside national troops for this exclusive purpose could lead to high
costs with low utility. Instead, she argued that the focus should be on
accelerating the response time of U.S. support for rapidly deployable
headquarters teams and logistics units and in providing a contracted lift
capability.25 Japan and the United Kingdom also focused on more rapid
deployment; the United Kingdom offered to send a force planning team
to assist the DPKO.2 6
The Security Council as a whole commented on the Secretary-Gen-
eral's report on February 22, 1995. As a permanent member of the Coun-
cil, the U.S. Government joined in the following collective assessment by
Council members:
24. U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 8492d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3492 (1995).
25. Id. at 22-25.
26. For the U.M. position, see U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3492d mtg., at 2-5, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3492 (1995); for the statement of the Japanese representative, see id. at 33-36.
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The Security Council shares the Secretary-General's concern regarding the
availability of troops and equipment for peacekeeping operations. It recalls
earlier statements by the President of the Council on the subject and reiter-
ates the importance of improving the capacity of the United Nations for
rapid deployment and reinforcement of operations. To that end, it encour-
ages the Secretary-General to continue his study of options aimed at
improving the capacity for such rapid deployment and reinforcement. The
Council believes that the first priority in improving the capacity for rapid
deployment should be the further enhancement of the existing standby
arrangements, covering the full spectrum of resources, including arrange-
ments for lift and headquarters capabilities, required to mount and execute
peacekeeping operations. It strongly encourages the Secretary-General to
take further steps in this regard, including the establishment of a compre-
hensive database to cover civilian as well as military resources. In this con-
text, it considers that particular attention should be given to the greatest
possible interoperability between elements identified in such arrangements.
The Council reiterates its call to Member States not already doing so to
participate in the standby arrangements. While affirming the principle that
contributing Governments should ensure that their troops arrive with all
the equipment needed to be fully operational, the Council also encourages
the Secretary-General and Member States to continue to consider means,
whether in the context of standby arrangements or more broadly, to
address the requirements of contingents which may need additional equip-
ment or training.
27
IV. Government Proposals
In April 1995, the Dutch Government introduced a thirty-three page pro-
posal detailing a plan for a "UN Rapid Deployment Brigade" to be deploy-
able immediately following a Security Council decision to mount an
operation.2 8 Such a U.N. brigade would have a flexible capacity to under-
take several tasks: preventive deployment, peacekeeping during the inter-
val between Security Council authorization and the arrival of a regular
U.N. peacekeeping operation, Chapter VII operations, and humanitarian
emergency situations.
The proposed U.N. brigade would consist of light infantry with
armored vehicles. For air and sea lift, reinforcement, replacement, and
evacuation, the U.N. brigade would require the assistance of Member
States. Personnel would be individually recruited and either based at one
location or distributed, on a battalion basis, over several locations.
The Canadian Government has embarked on a more systematic study
with more comprehensive, phased recommendations. The Canadians
have recommended creation of a standing "U.N. Vanguard Force." The
Canadian Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministries are looking at U.N.
27. Statement By the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3503d
mtg., at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1995/9 (1995).
28. Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their
Aspects, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 79, U.N. Doc. A/49/886, S/1995/276
(1995).
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options in the short, medium, and long-term and have solicited views from
other governments.
Meanwhile, the United States is uniquely capable of pursuing the fol-
lowing activities, mandated by PDD-25 and critical to any effort to improve
U.N. rapid reaction capabilities:
1. Help the United Nations develop a rapidly deployable headquarters
team.
2. Help the United Nations develop a composite initial logistics support
unit. The United States can assist with developing a surge capability in stra-
tegic (wholesale) logistics. The United States remains almost the only
source for this capability, which is needed both in the start-up and wind-
down of U.N. peace operations. The United States can continue its
targeted assistance in management and logistics reforms that will assist the
United Nations in focusing requests during these surge periods.
3. Help the United Nations develop an airlift capability available at very
short notice through pre-negotiated contracts with commercial carriers and
Member States.
4. Help the United Nations develop larger and better qualified civilian
resources for peace operations (for example, a civilian reserve corps). The
United States can assist the United Nations to acquire the services of special-
ized support personnel (in technical fields and trades) through commercial
contracts.
5. Help the United Nations budget for new operations. This is critical.
Once the Security Council approves a mission to address a fast-breaking
security problem, the United Nations needs a fast-track means of financing
start-up costs so that the mission can deploy immediately. (In March 1994
the Secretary-General proposed that Member States be immediately
assessed one-third of the total amount included in the financial implica-
tions estimate provided to the Security Council.) 29
V. Pragmatic Next Steps
In the near-term, nations should strengthen the standby capabilities of
national forces in preparation for potential multinational peace opera-
tions. The United Nations must develop as much flexibility as possible in
order to respond effectively to emergencies.
In that spirit, there are two pragmatic means available to address the
issue of rapid deployment. First, it is necessary to improve the infrastruc-
ture of the United Nations, particularly of the DPKO, in order to under-
take a wider range of military operations. In this area, guided by PDD-25,
the United States has taken the lead to improve the efficiency, staffing,
headquarters capabilities, information net, and command responsibilities
of the United Nations.
Second, the Secretary-General himself has recognized the difficulties
associated with the current state of U.N. enforcement action. In fact, he
29. See Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peacekeeping: Report of the Secre-
tary-General U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Items 87, 138, U.N. Doc. A/48/403, S/
26450 (1994). See also U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 28th mtg., at 23-24, U.N. Doc. A/49/
PV.28 (1994).
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has acknowledged that, in many respects, it is unrealistic to expect success-
ful enforcement action under Chapter VII at this time. 0 The Secretary-
General has discussed the advantages and disadvantages of U.N. authoriza-
tion of coalition actions.3 ' In the past, he has encouraged U.N.-author-
ized coalition actions in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti.
On July 31, 1994, the Security Council authorized the U.S.-led mul-
tinational force that eventually entered Haiti on September 19, 1994.32
The United States was able to bring its forces together relatively quickly to
spearhead the Haiti operation. Similarly, the French volunteered to enter
Rwanda and did so, but only with U.N. Security Council authorization. 33
In Bosnia, NATO has acted only under the authorization of the Security
Council.3 4
It is clearly possible to obtain rapid reaction capabilities by combining
Security Council authorization with multinational coalition action. These
coalitions will test the political will of Member States. Governments must
find the best way to balance the Secretary-General's willingness to use
coalitions as a crutch-a necessary one, particularly for large operations-
and the U.S. Government's attraction to such coalitions because they per-
mit the United States to structure command, control, and effectiveness of
the force. Despite the considerable cost of coalitions, they enhance flexi-
bility, provided there is political will among the Member States.
We should not completely rule out the possibility of establishing a
rapid reaction force. The Rwanda experience was tragically instructive for
the Security Council and all Member State governments. The post-geno-
cide experience has been equally instructive. For example, the countries
on the U.N. standby list were not willing to send troops to provide refugee
camp security in Zaire in late 1994.
Many commentators are attracted to the concept of an all-volunteer
30. The Secretary-General recently stated that
[o]ne of the achievements of the Charter of the United Nations was to
empower the Organization to take enforcement action against those responsi-
ble for threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. How-
ever, neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the
capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose,
except perhaps on a very limited scale. I believe that it is desirable in the long
term that the United Nations develop such a capacity, but it would be folly to
attempt to do so at the present time when the Organization is resource-starved
and hard pressed to handle the less demanding peacemaking and peacekeep-
ing responsibilities entrusted to it.
Supplement to An Agenda For Peace, supra note 22, at 18.
31. Id. at 18-19.
32. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
(1994).
33. S.C. Res. 925, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3388th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/925
(1994).
34. See S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3122d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/781(1992); S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3208th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824
(1993); S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/836
(1993); S.C. Res. 844, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3241st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/844
(1993).
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force comprised of individuals from different countries.3 5 Problems asso-
ciated with an all-volunteer force, however, include its cost, training, com-
mand, and the temptation to use it for ambitious but potentially unworthy
aims. Such a force may tempt the United Nations to become the global
policeman in a manner that the Security Council ultimately will have a
hard time controlling.
One of the fundamental purposes of PDD-25 is to force decision-mak-
ers to consider a rigorous set of factors before deploying troops, whether
rapidly or otherwise. The United Nations has embraced these factors to a
large extent.36 The purpose is to require the Council members to con-
sider carefully whether or not to send their own troops and those of non-
Council members into possible hostilities. The existence of a rapid reac-
tion force comprised of volunteers could compel Council members to act
without due regard for the factors.
In the future, we should continue to examine the feasibility of a rapid
reaction force. However, the Administration's first priority is to properly
build the peacekeeping infrastructure. The United Nations Standby
Arrangements System is a critical part of that infrastructure and merits full
cooperation by Member States. In addition to traditional peacekeeping
operations, U.N.-authorized coalition efforts-admittedly complex opera-
tions for which Security Council approval is by no means simple-may
have to be the interim solution for Chapter VII operations before the
Council and Member States take larger steps toward an actual on-call capa-
bility as originally envisaged in the U.N. Charter.
35. See, e.g., Brian Urquhart, For a UN Volunteer MilitaryFor=, N.Y. REVEW OF BooKs
3 (1993).
36. See, e.g., U.N. documents described in 33 I.L.M. 795 (1994).
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